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By Sri Ramamoorti and William Olsen
Eighty percent of respondents to a
National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD) survey of public
company audit committees felt that
failure resulting from poor risk man-
agement couldn't happen to them.
However, 50 percent thought it could
happen to other companies.
This feeling of relative "invincibili-
ty" is similar to the statistically
impossible "Lake Wobegon" effect —
where "all the women are strong, all
the men are good-looking and all the
children are above average." Could
this Lake Wobegon effect — which
results from the human tendency to
overestimate one's achievements and
capabilities in relation to others —
extend to an organization's assess-
ment of its vulnerability to fraud risk?
Fraud is a human endeavor,
involving deception, purposeful
intent, intensity of desire, risk of
apprehension, violation of trust,
rationalization, etc. So, it is important
to understand the psychological fac-
tors that might influence the behav-
ior of fraud perpetrators. The ration-
ale for drawing on behavioral science
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insights is evident from the intuition
that one needs to "think like a crook
to catch a crook."
Many business professionals,
especially those in the finance arena,
tend to discount behavioral explana-
tions. But as the incidence of fraud
continues to grow, placing the spot-
light on behavioral factors may be an
important approach to not only
fraud detection, but to deterrence as
well.
The 2006 Report to the Nation
issued by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) noted that
U.S. organizations lose almost 5 per-
cent of their revenue to fraud, and
that the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)-based annual fraud estimate
for the U.S. was a whopping $652 bil-
lion. In light of such sobering statis-
tics, it behooves each and every
organization to understand the root
causes of fraud and proactively man-
age fraud risk.
Why FOCU5 on Fraud Risk?
Among the catastrophic risks afflict-
ing orgaruzations of all sizes is the
Many discount
behavioral explanations
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Solutions for Fraud Risk Factors
Among behavioral approaches and solutions to
the fraud risk factors are:
• Sound tone at the top, with management "walk-
ing the talk";
• Align incentive structures within the organization
in a way that does not encourage fraud perpetra-
tion;
• An active board and audit committee overseeing
management performance and activities (as well
as the work by external and internal auditors);
• Nurture a culture of integrity and ethics, support-
ed by an organizational code of conduct;
• Periodic ethics audits and enforcement of noted
violations of the code;
• Maintain an ethics and/or whistleblower hotline;
• Explicitly reward good behavior;
• Routine background checks for new and experi-
enced hires, as well as for making senior leader-
ship appointments (human resources needs to lead
this effort);
• Swift, decisive action to respond to incidents of
fraud so that employees and others are aware of
the organization's serious commitment to dealing
with fraud issues head-on;
• Fraud awareness training, perhaps delivered by
internal audit professionals or outside consultants,
including description of ethics hotlines and guid-
ance on what to do when fraud is encountered;
and
• Control self-assessments that consist of process risk
owners performing risk and control mapping (and
including fraud risk considerations in such exercises).
people to do dishonest
things. The sociology
iind criminology litera-
ture describes fraud per-
petrators as "trust viola-
tors," In other words,





risk of financial fraud. A single alle-
gation of material fraud has such
devastating financial consequences,
including irreparable reputational
damage, that few companies survive
such a crisis unscathed. Fraud tends
to be frequently a hidden risk, partic-
ularly because its perpetrators take
extreme care to conceal their activi-
ties; hence, it also remains an unman-
aged risk in organizations.
Nevertheless, it is rare that any
company deliberately sets out to per-
petrate a massive fraud. Instead,
fraud is the unfortunate consequence
of a multitude of mostly behavioral
factors that drives otherwise honest
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Behavioral Root
Causes of Fraud
Much has been written
about the root causes of
fraud and the "fraud tri-








unrecognized is that all
three elements of the
fraud triangle are funda-
mentally behavioral con-
structs. Personal incen-
tives and perceived pres-
sure drive human
behavior, and the need
to rationalize wrongdo-
ing as being somehow
defensible is very much
psychologically rooted.
To some extent, even
the assessment of the
opportunity to commit
fraud — including the
likelihood of being caught — is a
subjective, behavioral assessment.
Accordingly, to understand the root
causes of fraud, psychological
answers and explanations rather
than logical ones should be sought.
The decision to deviate from the
norm and commit fraud is not taken
lightly; it involves "rationalization," or
the ability to justify one's own ques-
tionable actions to oneself and others.
A tragic example is Enron Corp.'s Cliff
Baxter, who couldn't come to terms
psychologically with what had hap-
pened, and took the extraordinary
step of corrmiitting suicide.
While corporate governance
reform legislation such as the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 can help
limit the opportunity for fraud, suc-
cumbing to perceived pressure and
the ability to rationalize fraudulent
acts are outside the scope of law. As
such, fraud deterrence and detection
should focus on how to deal with the
underlying behavioral dynamics —
the psychology of fraud perpetrators,
as well as the psychology of those
responsible for governance, includ-
ing auditors.
Psychology of Fraud Perpetrators
An understanding of what motivates
the fraudster, whether acting alone or
in collusion with others within or
outside an organization, can go a
long way in identifying behavioral
risk factors that may indicate fraud.
A simple means-motives-opportunity
analysis would show that motives
are the crux of the matter, because
fraud requires the establishment of
intent to deceive another.
So, it is crucial to know what it is
that a fraud perpetrator desires:
money (bonus, stock-based compen-
sation), status ("keeping up with the
Joneses," fame or celebrity status),
revenge, a catch-me-if-you-can game,
parity with others (everybody else is
doing it, why can't I?), etc.
If opportunities do not exist, the
motivated fraud perpetrator can cre-
ate them by a careful analysis of
weaknesses in controls or by exploit-
ing a generally lax environment.
However, once fraud perpetrators
take the initial steps, they frequently
find themselves unable to turn back
and escape the ruinous consequences.
Organizations must communicate
to employees acceptable standards of
behavior through a well-crafted code
of conduct that is endorsed by lead-
ership and enforced when necessary.
Organizations should also develop a
track record of acting swiftly and
decisively whenever wrongdoing
comes to light.
And, in every case, organizations
must go to extreme lengths to protect
a whistlebiower's identity and safety
(from retaliation). Otherwise, poten-
tial fraud perpetrators are likely to
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exploit the inertia or complacency in
addressing fraud risk adequately. As
ACFE founder Joe Wells counsels,
"Let them know you're watching."
Understanding Financial
Statement Fraud
Thus, erstwhile honest and well-
meaning executives who have earned
the trust of others are often the ones
who end up perpetrating fraud.
Fraud does not start with dishonesty;
it starts with pressure: Pressure to
achieve aggressive financial perform-
ance goafs, or meet analyst expecta-
tions, frequently leads those who are
expected to make the numbers to
simply "make up" the numbers. Like
many other organizational risks,
fraud usually starts small before it
snowballs, becomes widespread,
rampant and material. Not surpris-
ingly, the gray areas of accounting
ripe for abuse are those that are com-
plex, ambiguous and subjective.
Complexity can help mask fraud.
Among reasons managers cook
the books are;
1. to meet analyst expectations
and forecasts about earnings;
2. to smooth earnings and income
to reduce volatility (to mask financial
distress and negative cash flows);
3. to benefit from compensation or
bonuses tied to earnings or to stay
within debt covenants imposed by
lenders; and
4. to avoid sanctions by deliber-
ately deflating current earnings or to
win subsidies or import relief as a
protectionist advantage.
In such contexts, the award of
executive stock options provides fur-
ther incentives to manipulate earn-
ings, including enlisting the support
and cooperation of junior, economi-
cally dependent and vulnerable staff
and employees.
In all circumstances, tone from the
top is critical, and there is no excuse
for senior executives or other
employees to be active participants in
a corrupt organizational culture.
Approaches to Deterring and
Mitigating Financial Fraud Risk
From an organizational perspective.
the goal is to create an environment
that endorses a "good ethics is good
business" philosophy, encourages
doing the right thing at every turn
and makes perpetrating fraud an
unattractive option to most people in
the organization.
It is true that economics and ethics
do not mix very well — there are
numerous examples of how incen-
tives have trumped personal ethics
and values. Nevertheless, cultural
assimilation into a system of high
integrity and values represents a
form of programming of the human
mind that cannot be easily compro-
mised. A culture of ethics has signifi-
cant potential in reducing integrity
risks. Rewarding people for doing
the right thing sends the right signal
to others in the organization, while
shooting the messenger in the case of
a whistleblower allegation sends the
wrong signal.
To discharge their monitoring and
oversight function effectively, audit
committees need a primer on the psy-
chology of the fraud perpetrator(s), as
well as insight about their own and
the auditors' cognitive weaknesses.
The audit committee, with assis-
tance from the internal and external
auditors, as well as other risk man-
agement specialists and the board, is
responsible for monitoring the
behavior of management, especially
with respect to financial reporting.
However, in the current corporate
governance climate, this mandate
sometimes extends beyond financial
reporting matters.
One important behavioral insight
is recognizing that high-level fraud is
frequently a team sport that often
involves collusion. Internal control
systems that presume proper segrega-
tion of duties are not effective against
collusion and management override
of controls. In fact, a COSO Fraud
Study published in 1999 found that in
83 percent of the frauds examined,
the CEO and the CFO had colluded.
Still another problematic area is
the well-known "groupthink" bias at
the board level. Groupthink discounts
contrarian opinions or tends to sway
the group into making a "feel good"
decision. When there is an active ten-
dency to ignore bad news due to
either indifference or sheer laziness,
board members may miss important
signals of potential fraud.
External and internal auditors
need to learn that "absence of evi-
dence is not evidence of absence."
Just because no red flags or fraud
indicia are observed does not mean
that fraud does not exist. The trusted
relationships that subsist between
external auditors and their clients
sometimes make auditors let their
guard down.
When encountering fraud scenar-
ios, human tendencies such as the
confirmation bias (seeking confirma-
tion of one's beliefs) and selective
perception (seeing only what one
wants to see) limit auditors' ability to
exercise an appropriate level of pro-
fessional skepticism.
Interestingly, the significance of
behavioral science insights increases
even more when we move into the
domain of fraud investigahon. But that
is clearly the subject of another article.
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TAKEAWAYS
» Fraud is a human endeavor that
involves deception, purposeful intent,
intensity of desire, risk of apprehension,
violation of trust, rationalization, etc.
» The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners found that U.S. organizations
lose almost 5 percent of their revenue to
fraud and that the GDP-based annual
fraud estimate for the U.S. was $652 bil-
lion in 2006.
» An understanding of what motivates
fraudsters can go a long way in identify-
ing behaviorial risk factors.
» Organizations need to create environ-
ments that endorse ethics and doing the
right thing at every turn, making perpe-
trating fraud an unattractive option.
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